dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaDynamic Incentivized Cooperation under Changing Rewards
| Authors | Philipp Altmann, Thomy Phan, Maximilian Zorn, Claudia Linnhoff-Popien, Sven Koenig |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | 2601.06382vv1 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06382 |
| License | http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ |
Abstract
Peer incentivization (PI) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning approach where all agents can reward or penalize each other to achieve cooperation in social dilemmas. Despite their potential for scalable cooperation, current PI methods heavily depend on fixed incentive values that need to be appropriately chosen with respect to the environmental rewards and thus are highly sensitive to their changes. Therefore, they fail to maintain cooperation under changing rewards in the environment, e.g., caused by modified specifications, varying supply and demand, or sensory flaws - even when the conditions for mutual cooperation remain the same. In this paper, we propose Dynamic Reward Incentives for Variable Exchange (DRIVE), an adaptive PI approach to cooperation in social dilemmas with changing rewards. DRIVE agents reciprocally exchange reward differences to incentivize mutual cooperation in a completely decentralized way. We show how DRIVE achieves mutual cooperation in the general Prisoner's Dilemma and empirically evaluate DRIVE in more complex sequential social dilemmas with changing rewards, demonstrating its ability to achieve and maintain cooperation, in contrast to current state-of-the-art PI methods.
{
"annotation_id": "1db34c52-532f-4999-b8e9-80f1a106cc1a",
"date_created": "2026-02-17T05:53:07.567000Z",
"date_modified": "2026-02-17T05:53:07.567000Z",
"file_hash": "e529eadde76e13a8086dadce0b301fabd4475dfd8e40a40f1ffecb443d5e7bf4",
"private": false,
"record": {
"abstract": "Peer incentivization (PI) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning approach where all agents can reward or penalize each other to achieve cooperation in social dilemmas. Despite their potential for scalable cooperation, current PI methods heavily depend on fixed incentive values that need to be appropriately chosen with respect to the environmental rewards and thus are highly sensitive to their changes. Therefore, they fail to maintain cooperation under changing rewards in the environment, e.g., caused by modified specifications, varying supply and demand, or sensory flaws - even when the conditions for mutual cooperation remain the same. In this paper, we propose Dynamic Reward Incentives for Variable Exchange (DRIVE), an adaptive PI approach to cooperation in social dilemmas with changing rewards. DRIVE agents reciprocally exchange reward differences to incentivize mutual cooperation in a completely decentralized way. We show how DRIVE achieves mutual cooperation in the general Prisoner\u0027s Dilemma and empirically evaluate DRIVE in more complex sequential social dilemmas with changing rewards, demonstrating its ability to achieve and maintain cooperation, in contrast to current state-of-the-art PI methods.",
"arxiv_id": "2601.06382",
"authors": [
"Philipp Altmann",
"Thomy Phan",
"Maximilian Zorn",
"Claudia Linnhoff-Popien",
"Sven Koenig"
],
"categories": [
"cs.MA"
],
"license": "http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/",
"title": "Dynamic Incentivized Cooperation under Changing Rewards",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06382",
"version": "v1"
},
"schema_id": "dorsal/arxiv",
"source": {
"execution_id": "7be058f6-abda-4c93-b681-218a8deb6028",
"id": "arXiv Dataset",
"type": "Model",
"variant": "snapshot-2026-01-17",
"version": "0.1.0"
},
"user_id": 1000002
}