dorsal/arxiv
View SchemaLINEture: novel signature cryptosystem
| Authors | Gennady Khalimov, Yevgen Kotukh |
|---|---|
| Categories | |
| ArXiv ID | 2601.07071vv1 |
| URL | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.07071 |
| License | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
Abstract
We propose a novel digital signature cryptosystem that exploits the concept of the brute-force problem. To ensure the security of the cryptosystem, we employed several mechanisms: sharing a common secret for factorable permutations, associating permutations with the message being signed, and confirming knowledge of the shared secret using a zero-knowledge proof. We developed a secret-sharing theory based on homomorphic matrix transformations for factorized permutations. The inverse matrix transformation for computing the shared secret is determined by secret parameters, which results in incompletely defined functionality and gives rise to a brute-force cryptanalysis problem. Randomization of session keys using a message hash and random parameters guarantees the uniqueness of each signature, even for identical messages. We employed a zero-knowledge authentication protocol to confirm knowledge of the shared secret, thereby protecting the verifier against unauthorized signature imposition. The LINEture cryptosystem is built on linear matrix algebra and does not rely on a computationally hard problem. High security is achieved through the appropriate selection of matrix transformation dimensions. Matrix computations potentially offer low operational costs for signature generation and verification.
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"abstract": "We propose a novel digital signature cryptosystem that exploits the concept of the brute-force problem. To ensure the security of the cryptosystem, we employed several mechanisms: sharing a common secret for factorable permutations, associating permutations with the message being signed, and confirming knowledge of the shared secret using a zero-knowledge proof. We developed a secret-sharing theory based on homomorphic matrix transformations for factorized permutations. The inverse matrix transformation for computing the shared secret is determined by secret parameters, which results in incompletely defined functionality and gives rise to a brute-force cryptanalysis problem. Randomization of session keys using a message hash and random parameters guarantees the uniqueness of each signature, even for identical messages. We employed a zero-knowledge authentication protocol to confirm knowledge of the shared secret, thereby protecting the verifier against unauthorized signature imposition. The LINEture cryptosystem is built on linear matrix algebra and does not rely on a computationally hard problem. High security is achieved through the appropriate selection of matrix transformation dimensions. Matrix computations potentially offer low operational costs for signature generation and verification.",
"arxiv_id": "2601.07071",
"authors": [
"Gennady Khalimov",
"Yevgen Kotukh"
],
"categories": [
"cs.CR"
],
"license": "http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
"title": "LINEture: novel signature cryptosystem",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.07071",
"version": "v1"
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